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1N THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GER.AtLD SCANDRETT,
Plaintiff-App-ellant,

-vsJOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.

12316

Def endmn.t-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE,
Appellant appeals from the order denying petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a petition on November 2, 1970,
seeking release from the Utah State Prison on the
ground that his state of intoxication at the time of his
arrest rendered him incapable of giving a valid confession.

On November 4, 1970, the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft, Judge, ruled as a matter of law that the petition
be summarily denied on the basis that petitioner's claim
had previously been properly decided on appeal to the
Utah Supreme Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the order denying
writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was charged with second degree murder
and pleaded not guilty. The facts relating to the charge
were those surrounding the stabbing to death of a companion in a hotel room in November, 1968.
On March 25, 1969, a trial was held ·without a jury
before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. After hearing
the evidence as stipulated by the prosecution and defense attorneys, the court found appellant guilty of
second degree murder.
Appellant appealed this conviction and raised the
issues concerning the validity of his confession as it may
have been invalidated by an advanced state of intoxication. Appellant's "knowing and intelligent" waiver of
counsel was also questioned in that appeal on the
theory that intoxication could invalidate such a waiver.
This Court affirmed the trjal court conviction of the
appellant. State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d
639 (1970).

On November 2, 1970, appellant petitioned the Court
of the Third Judicial District for writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant asked for relief on the same issues that were
previously decided on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Utah. He contended that at the time of his ·arrest he
was intoxicated to the extent that he was incapable of
giving a voluntary confession and intelligently and
knowingly waive his right to counsel.
In denying that petition, the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft found:
"A review of the opmwn of ·Chief Justice
Crockett, now reported in 24 U.2d 202, 468 P.2d
639, reveals that the contention petitioner now
seeks to raise in his petiion for writ of habeas
corpus was thoroughly explored by Judge Faux
upon trial by a motion to suppress the confession
because of Scandrett's alleged intoxication at the
time it was given and such contention also formed
the sole basis of his appeal to the Supreme Court
of Utah and was thoroughly considered by that
court and rejected by it." (R. 9-10).
AppeHant now appeals to the Utah Supreme Court
from Judge Croft's denial of the writ of habeas corpus.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUES PRESENT IN THIS APPEAL TO
THE UT AH SUPREME COURT WERE PREVIOUSLY DECIDED IN STATE V. SCANDRETT, 24 Utah
2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970) WHICH SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED IN THE PRESENT APPEAL.
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The issues presented by this case as an appeal from
a habeas corpus proceeding are identical to the constitutional issues that were raised by the appellant in his first
appeal based on the conviction (Case No. 11733), State
v. Soanidrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970).
This Court has already been presented with the
same facts as have been alleged through the petition for
writ of habeas corpus. The constitutional issues have
not changed. The questions presented by a writ of
habeas corpus should be decided in accordance with the
prior decision of this Court.
The order denying the writ of habeas corpus by
Judge Croft correctly states the affect of this court's
prior decision.

"A review of the opm10n of Chief Justice

Crockett, now reported in 24 U.2d 202, 468 P.2d
639, reveals that the contention petitioner now
seeks to raise in his petition, for writ of habeas
corpus was thoroughly explored by Judge Faux
upon trial by a motion to suppress the confession
because of Seandrett's alleged intoxication at the
time it was given and such contention also formed
the sole basis of his appeal to the Supreme Court
of Utah and was thoroughly considered by that
court and rejected by it."
"In effect, what petitioner now seeks to do is

to have this court reverse the decision of the

Supreme Court of Utah. No new circumstances
are asserted by peti:tion•er and when upon proper
appeal, our Sitpreme Court has afre.(J;dJy ruled
upon the validity of plaintiff's conviction and the
admissibility of the confession, the constitution--
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a.lity of the conviction of that issue becomes res
adjudicata and binding upon this court." (R.
9-10). (Emphasis added.)
Where the constitutional issues raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus are identical to the facts
and issues raised on prior appeal by the same person,
the doctrine of res adjudicata should apply.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE
APPELLANT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

Appellant contends that the admission into evidence
of the alleged confession was reversible error. He asserts that the confession was made without the benefit of
counsel and without a valid waiver of his constitutional
rights. His contention is premised solely on the fact
that because he was drunk he could not make an intelligent and knowing waiver. Respondent presented evidence showing that the appellant was given his Miranda
warnings.
Intoxication affecting an accused's ability to waive
his rights and confess is a question to be determined by
the trial judge. Winn v. State, 44 Ala. App. 268, 207
So.2d 138 (1968). Judge Faux, after a hearing, denied
appellant's motion to suppress the confession. He determined that appellant was coherent and could intelligently and knowingly waive his right to remain silent

ti

and his right to counsel. It should be noted that appellant's confession was not ever presented to a jury. The
case was presented on stipulated facts before Judge
Faux. The prejudicial consequences of a jury hearing a
confession 1vere not present in this case. This is particulal'ly significant when it is noted that appellant made
voluntary statements before ever being taken into
custody. This fact alone is sufficient to distinquish
Logner v. North Carolina, 260 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. N.C.
1966). It also can be distinquished on other grounds. In
Laguer the defendant was not only intoxicated but also
under the influence of amphetamines. The amount consumed deprived him of the capacity to make a statement
about the traffic accident in which he was involved. The
appellant Scandrett, on the other hand, was able to tell
the story not only once but several times, and each time
his story was coherent and consistent with the previous
telling.
Coherence, rationality, and responsiveness are all
relevant factors in determining the extent of influence
that alcohol has on a person when he confesses or waives
his rights. In re Cameron, 67 Cal. R,ptr. 529, 68 Cal.2d
487, 439 P.2d 633 (1968). Whether an accused has intelligently waived his right to counsel depends in each case
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the case. Appellant's conduct in the instant case indicated that he wanted to talk without counsel. In State v.
"ft1att, 251 Or. 134, 444 P.2d 914 (1968), the Oregon
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Supreme Court held that an intoxicated defendant by
his conduct had waived his right to counsel.
"A. v_erbal acknowledgement of understanding
and w1llmgness to talk, followed by conduct which
is consistent only with a waiver of his right to
have his lawyer present, by one who has been
advised of his. rights, constitutes an effective
vrniver of his right to counsel at that stage of the
proceeding." Id. at 444 P.2d 915.
The trial judge in the instant case after listening to the
recording of the confession determined that it was very
coherent and that appeUant could knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. The officers who
observed the appellant testified that he spoke coherently,
appeared to lmderstand the questions put to him, and
made intelligent and spontaneous responses to those
questions (T. 108).
Mere intoxication does not prevent a person from
making a valid waiver. In Fant v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp.
457 CW.D. Va. 1969), the court held that defendant's intoxicated condition did not prevent him from waiving
his rights under Miranda. In People v. Stroud, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 270, 273 Cal. App.2d 670 (1969, a California appellate court was faced with an almost identical fact
situation as in the instant case. Stroud killed his wife
about 6 :00 p.m. He called a deputy sheriff who arrived
a little after 6 :00. Stroud then confessed to the deputy.
Later at 8 :30 p.m. a tape recorder was set up, and Stroud
was advised of his rights. He waived his rights and confessed. At 10.00 p.m., a blood alcohol test was taken. It
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revealed an alcohol content of .229 milligrams. Presumably the blood alcohol content would have been somewhat
higher earlier when he made the confessions. After hearing the conflicting testimony, the trial judge ruled that
despite the illllount of alcohol, Stroud was able to knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights
under Miranda. In affirming the trial judge the appellate court said:
"Keeping in mind the rule that our review of
the record is not a fact finding process, we measure the totality of circumstances in the light of
uncontroverted evidence and the trial court's
resolution of conflicting evidence. About the only
pertinent uncontradicted fact is that at 10 p.m.
defendant's alcohol blood content was .229 milligrams. But a blood alcohol content of .229, standing alone, neither proves nor disproves defendant's capacity to wniderstand and rationalize, since
there is no established statutory or decisional
standard correlating blood alcohol content with
cerebral impairment of which this court can take
judicial notice. Consequently the import of and
inference to be drawn from an alcohol blood content of .229 must rest wpon other relevant evidence." Id. at 78 Cal.Rptr. 276 (Emphasis added.)
In the present case the defense put on an expert witness. However, this expert witness had never observed
anyone with a blood-alcohol count above· .1 (R. 74, Case
No. 11733). He admitted that a specified amount of
alcohol in the blood would affect different individuals
differently (R. 74, 75, 86), and that it would be "unprecise" to speculate on the extent of the impairment of

mental faculties at .2G (T. 76, 83), and that
it would have been "immeasurably" helpful to have been
present and heard and observed him while intoxicated
(T. 83).
The blood alcohol content in this case cannot be relied upon as the sole factor in determining whether appellant waived his rights. It does not prove that appellant's capacity to understand was substantially impaired.
Other relevant factors to be considered are the accused's
response to questions, his voluntary statement, his manner of speaking, his syntax, his grammar, and his mode
of speech as revealed by the taped statements. These
factors, along with the blood alcohol level, were considered by the trial judge. He listened to the taped confession and ruled that Mr. Scandrett had made a knowing
and intelligent waiver, and that the confession was
admissible (T. 98-99, Case No.11733).
This ruling was correct. In the absence of any
"statutory or decisional standard correlating blood
hol content with cerebral impairment," Judge Faux was
free to recognize1 and conclude that "much depends upon
the reaction of each individual person," and that appellant's ability to remember and narrate the incidents of
the stabbing in smooth, unslurred speech, as revealed by
the tape, was more conclusive proof of his mental capacity than was the expert testimony as to what appellant's
mental capacity might have been.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS GIVEN
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VOLUNTARILY AND THAT INTOXICATION DID
NOT RENDER IT INVOLUNTARY.

To render a confession inadmissible, drug or alcohol intoxication must be of such a degree as to negate
the defendant's comprehension and render him unconsious of what he is saying. If the defendant understands
the statements directed to him and knows what he is
saying, the confession is admissible. Sta:te v. ·Manuel, 253
La. 195, 217 So.2d 369 ( 1969). 'There was no evidence
presented at the trial which indicated that appellant was
unconscious of ·what he was saying. He understood the
statements directed to him and voluntarily waived his
rights before he confessed.
A very comprehensive view of the cases on the subject of the effect of intoxication on the voluntariness of
confessions is found in 69 A.L.R.. 2d 361, wherein, at page
364, the annotation says :
"The courts are agreed that proof that one
who has confessed to crime was intoxicated at the
time of making a confession goes to the weight
and credibility to be accorded to the confession,
but does not require (at least where the intoxication does not amount to mania, and the intoxicants
were not furnished the accused by the police or
other go>vernment officials) that the confession
be excluded from evidence." 69 A.L.R.2d 361, 364.
This annotation appeared in 1960 and since that
time many cases have considered the question before
this Court. Even since Miranda1, most of the cases refer
to and approve the rule as stated in the annotation. See:
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State v. Cuzzeto, 76 Wash.2d 428, 457 P.2d 204 (1969);
State v. Mawuel, siupra, People v. Green, 105 Ill.App.2d
345, 245 N.E.2d 507 (1969).
The case on which the appellant places his greatest
reliance is Logner v. North Carolina, supra. Logner,
however, was so drunk when ·arrested that he could not
make a statement about the traffic collision in which
he was involved. He was still very drunk during the
afternoon when he was interrogated.
Also in Warren v. State, 44 Ala.App. 221, 205 So.2d
916 ( 1967) the court said:
"The proof clearly shows that defendant's
intoxication amounted to mania, that is, he was
so drunk as to be unconscious of the. meaming of
his words, and that such intoxication rendered
inadmissible his confession." Id. at 225, 205 So.2d
at 919.
A similar result was reached in State v. Williams, 208
So.2d 177 (Miss. 1968). The defendant's :intoxication had
produced mania, and his confession was held to be inadmissible.
1

Respondent submits that this standard should be
adopted by this Court in determining whether appellant's
confession was voluntary and should have been admitted.
The State further submits that appellant's intoxication
did not per se render his confession involuntary and
hence inadmissable. His conduct did not amount to
mania or render him unconscious of what he was saying.
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State v. Thornton, 22 Ut. 2d 140, 449 P.2d 987 (1969), in an
analogous fact situation is authority for this proposition.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the appellant intelligently,
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
The confession was made voluntarily and should be determined to be within the constitutional guidelines.
The Utah Supreme Court properly decided the prior
appeal found in 24 Utah 202, 468 P.2d 639' (1970) and
under the doctrine of res adjudicata and for the reasons
stated in the prior opinion, respondent submits that the
denial of the writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNE Y
Attorney General
1

LAUREN N. BE!ASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

